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Children’s cognitive control and knowledge at school entry predict growth rates in
analogical reasoning skill over time; however, the mechanisms by which these factors
interact and impact learning are unclear. We propose that inhibitory control (IC) is critical
for developing both the relational representations necessary to reason and the ability
to use these representations in complex problem solving. We evaluate this hypothesis
using computational simulations in a model of analogical thinking, Discovery of Relations
by Analogy/Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogy (DORA/LISA; Doumas
et al., 2008). Longitudinal data from children who solved geometric analogy problems
repeatedly over 6 months show three distinct learning trajectories though all gained
somewhat: analogical reasoners throughout, non-analogical reasoners throughout, and
transitional – those who start non-analogical and grew to be analogical. Varying the
base level of top-down lateral inhibition in DORA affected the model’s ability to learn
relational representations, which, in conjunction with inhibition levels used in LISA during
reasoning, simulated accuracy rates and error types seen in the three different learning
trajectories. These simulations suggest that IC may not only impact reasoning ability but
may also shape the ability to acquire relational knowledge given reasoning opportunities.
Keywords: analogical reasoning, relational knowledge, inhibitory control, development, computational modeling,
cognitive control
INTRODUCTION
Analogical reasoning, the process of representing information as systems of relationships and
mapping between these representations, is ubiquitous in learning and discovery throughout the
lifespan, and is part of what makes humans uniquely intelligent and adaptive (Gentner, 2003; Penn
et al., 2008). Analogical reasoning may play a crucial role in childhood, serving as a cognitive-
bootstrapping mechanism that enables children to make increasingly abstract inferences and
generalizations (e.g., Gentner, 2003), and supporting learning across a wide range of educational
domains (Richland and Simms, 2015). The mechanisms by which children’s analogical reasoning
improve, however, are not well understood. In particular, little attention has been paid to the
processes by which children develop the relational representations used for analogical reasoning.
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Children’s cognitive-control resources have been implicated as
one source of individual differences in relational representation
and reasoning (see Morrison et al., 2004; Viskontas et al.,
2004; Simms et al., 2018). Also described as executive function
(EF) (Diamond, 2013), these resources refer to the ability to
use selective attention to manipulate the contents of working
memory, and are believed to include a variety of functions
including inhibitory control (IC), updating, and shifting (Miyake
et al., 2000; Banich, 2009). Cross-sectional studies have revealed
that children who can solve analogies successfully make mistakes
when the requirements for cognitive control are raised, either
by increasing the requirements for controlling attention in
the face of distraction, or increasing the complexity of the
relations (Richland et al., 2006; Thibaut et al., 2010a,b). The
difficulty of controlling attention to relations in the face of
distraction has been identified across children from different
cultural and linguistic backgrounds (Richland et al., 2010).
Computational work simulating such cross-cultural data through
a combination of knowledge and IC has provided support
for the interpretation that knowledge is necessary but not
sufficient for representing relations, and that these errors
are due to low levels of resources for IC (Morrison et al.,
2011).
However, a full theory of relational reasoning development
must go beyond performance accuracy to provide a mechanism
for developmental change over time. There is reason to believe
that cognitive-control resources not only predict performance
at a single time point (see Simms et al., 2018), but also may
impact children’s growth in reasoning skill. An analysis of
data from a large-scale longitudinal study found that children’s
performance at school entry on an IC task (Children’s Stroop;
Gerstadt et al., 1994), and an EF task (Tower of Hanoi) both
predicted distinct variance in children’s analogical skill, and more
interestingly, their growth in analogical skill from school entry
to adolescence (Richland and Burchinal, 2013). This relationship
held even when controlling for environmental factors (e.g.,
parental education, SES, gender), as well as short-term memory,
sustained attention, knowledge measures, and analogy skill at
third grade. This pattern of change suggests that early EF skills
play an important role in shaping children’s trajectory of learning
reasoning skills.
Testing EF As a Mechanism
Underpinning Relational Reasoning
Growth
The current paper reports computational simulations that test a
mechanism by which early IC resources could alter the trajectory
by which children’s reasoning develops through the course of
children’s reasoning opportunities. We simulated data from one
of the few longitudinal studies on the development of analogical
reasoning (Hosenfeld et al., 1997a,b). Our aim was to explore
how relational knowledge and variations in children’s IC could
predict children’s rate of reasoning development over a series of
repeated opportunities to solve geometric analogies. We focus
in particular on the interplay between the learning of relational
representations and individual differences in IC.
Behavioral Data on Reasoning Change Over Time
In the original study (Hosenfeld et al., 1997b), 80 children aged
6–7 years, sampled randomly from the larger school sample
available, solved 20 geometric analogy problems. Seventy-one
of these children’s data were usable and were included in the
final analyses. The geometric analogy problems tested children’s
ability to identify and map five common relations between simple
shapes including: adding an element, changing size, halving,
doubling, and changing position repeatedly over eight testing
sessions (Figure 1).
The period of testing ranged from 140 to 161 days, (mean 153,
SD = 7.32) and the interval between the test sessions ranged from
13 to 35 days, with these being held constant across participant
(the longest interval was between Sessions 2 and 3, when there
was a school holiday). Participants were in regular school outside
of this study, with no explicit training in relation to geometric
analog ies. These were sessions in which participants solved
problems and were given feedback, so in some ways these were
both testing and training sessions.
The measure was originally designed by randomly combining
six basic geometric shapes and five transformations in different
ways to create 12,150 problems. The authors used the difficulty
metric (Difficulty = 0.5 × Elements + 1 × Transformations) to
select problems for a large norming project (Hosenfeld et al.,
1997a). Twenty of these problems were then selected for use in
the longitudinal study to represent a range of difficulty both with
respect to the difficulty metric and actual child performance.
During testing, children solved A:B::C:D problems in which
they had to infer the missing D term in order to construct a valid
analogy. Figure 1 provides three examples of these geometric
analogy items in increasing difficulty, showing duplication (top
line), halving/duplication and “inside” (middle line), and an
above/below/inside set of transformations (bottom line).
FIGURE 1 | Hosenfeld et al. (1997a) developed a geometric analogy task with
problems of varying complexity created using relations familiar to children
(e.g., above/below, inside, halving or duplication, rotation). Examples of
open-ended geometric analogy items of low (Problem 1), intermediate
(Problem 2), and high level of difficulty (Problem 3). The D-term has to be filled
in by the subjects (figure adapted from the Hosenfeld et al., 1997a).
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On each testing occasion, the children were first given practice
time. This included naming and drawing the basic geometric
shapes that would be part of the relational problems. They
were then told they would be solving puzzles and completed
three practice analogies with the experimenter. The following
instruction was provided: “These two boxes belong together
(point to A and B), and those two boxes belong together (point
to C and D). These two ones (A and B) belong together in the
same way as those ones (C and D) do. Do you know what the
solution is?” (Hosenfeld et al., 1997a, p. 375).
Twenty test items were then presented during each session,
in which children were instructed to draw the missing piece for
each problem and were provided with feedback following errors.
The problems within each session varied in complexity based on
changes in the number of relationships needed to characterize
the A:B transition. The internal consistency was adequately high
between items within each testing session, with alphas ranging
from α = 0.87–0.91, using the standard that above a 0.7 is
adequate. A Mokken scale analysis (Mokken, 1971) revealed
monotone homogeneity and double monotonicity, allowing the
authors to determine that the items and the subjects could
reliably be ordered on a common dimension of difficulty. Thus,
based on these difficulty ratings, parallel tests were constructed
and validated to show comparable difficulty across the eight
sessions.
Researchers recorded accuracy rates, time to solution,
and types of errors made. These data were used to examine
the trajectory of children’s analogical reasoning over the
course of the study. Children’s performance was then fitted
to parameter estimates of performance that reflected the
proportion of analogical (versus non-analogical) responses
as a function of test session. Modeling these parameters
revealed three linear trends, the three learning profiles which
will be simulated in this manuscript: (1) Non-analogical
reasoners, who solved the majority of problems non-analogically
throughout all sessions, (2) Transitional reasoners, who
moved from solving problems largely non-analogically to
solving problems largely analogically, and (3) Analogical
reasoners, who solved the majority of problems analogically
throughout the treatment. The reasoning accuracy results
for the three groups of children over time are shown in
Figure 7.
The data from Hosenfeld et al.’s (1997b) study are informative,
and they raise a challenge of interpretation. One cannot
fully explain these three trajectories by access to learning
opportunities, since all children were exposed to the same
number of training instances – though no data were provided
in the original manuscript regarding whether children took
advantage of training from all instances provided. Further,
children’s initial skill-based starting point is not fully predictive
either, since one group started low and ended high, and another
group started low and ended low. Cognitive maturation of
growth in EF capacity is a similarly unsatisfactory explanation.
While some EF growth over the period of 6 months might
be expected, there is no reason to expect three different yet
systematic patterns of EF growth that would explain these three
performance trajectories.
Current Simulation Study Aims
In the present study we use computational simulations of
these data to argue that (1) differences in IC EF resources
may explain initial differences in reasoning, but (2) they
also help to explain differences between the three groups
in their ability to learn relational representations necessary
for reasoning over repeated learning opportunities. Thus,
while all children received the same number of learning
opportunities during the eight training sessions, the level
of structure they identify in the problem inputs may
increase or decrease their likelihood of successfully reasoning
analogically with these representations over time. Furthermore,
the rate at which they learn is constrained by their IC EF
resources. The interaction of processing ability and learning
representations produces a more complete picture of the
development of analogical reasoning then either factor
independently.
To assess this hypothesis, we examine learning patterns for
a model with three levels of IC (high, medium, and low) and
three levels of prior knowledge (after the first 100 learning trials,
second and third 100 learning trials). Our aim is to best explain
the three learning trajectories identified in the Hosenfeld et al.
(1997b) data, and we find that an integration of IC and prior
knowledge as described provide the best simulation.
Computational Models of Analogical
Reasoning
Computational models of analogical reasoning provide a unique
window into the plausible cognitive underpinnings of relational
reasoning, and here enable us to test correlations between
the behavioral data and performance in a constrained system
(see French, 2002). We use Discovery of Relations by Analogy
(DORA; Doumas et al., 2008) as a model of how structured
relational representations are learned from unstructured inputs,
and Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogy (LISA;
Hummel and Holyoak, 1997, 2003) as a model of human
relational reasoning, to simulate Hosenfeld et al. (1997b) results,
and to explore the interactions between maturation-based
inhibition levels and learning opportunity cycles.
Inhibition is critical for several aspects of LISA and DORA’s
operation (see Knowlton et al., 2012). Reciprocal inhibition
is fundamental to establishing the oscillations responsible for
relational binding in LISA/DORA which occur via temporal
synchrony or systematic asynchrony (see Hummel and Holyoak,
1997, 2003; Doumas et al., 2008). In fact, this property of
inhibition is responsible for the models’ intrinsically limited
working-memory capacities (see Hummel and Holyoak, 2003,
Appendix A). However, inhibition is also important at another
level of processing.
As discussed previously IC is critical during analogical
reasoning to reduce interference from competing concepts
sharing perceptual or semantic similarity with elements of the
current information being considered in the analogy. Likewise
other irrelevant relations present either in the source or a
potential target may even interfere. Activation spreads between
related concepts in the model with the most active units
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eventually entered working memory and thus being available for
relational learning or reasoning. In order to keep focus on the
critical relations under consideration in the source, the models
postulate top-down lateral inhibition of propositions tagged as
low in goal-relevance which helps prevent these propositions
from entering the focus of attention in working memory.
Previously, we have successfully used changes in this top-
down lateral inhibition in LISA’s working-memory system
to explain cross-sectional variations in analogical reasoning.
We simulated the developmental progression (from age 3
to 14 years) in children’s ability to handle increases in
relational complexity and distraction from object similarity
during analogical reasoning by varying IC (Morrison et al.,
2011). In addition, we have modeled cross-cultural differences
in analogy performance (Richland et al., 2010), considered to
be the result of differences in relational knowledge accretion,
via changes to the hand-coded representations used in LISA
(Morrison et al., 2011).
In the current study we avoid hand coding of propositional
structures. Instead, we use DORA to simulate children’s ability
to learn spatial relations over time, allowing relational learning
patterns to be part of the investigation. We then use those
representations in LISA to simulate geometric analogy accuracy
and types of errors. By doing so, we are able to model the
trajectory of knowledge accretion as well as reasoning ability.
Importantly, we manipulate top-down lateral inhibition (via
changes to a parameter for this type of inhibition in both
models) to simulate individual differences. We argue that IC is
fundamental not only to the ability to reason relationally, but also
to the ability to learn relations in the first place.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Overview of LISA/DORA Model
In this section we describe the LISA (Hummel and Holyoak,
1997, 2003) and DORA (Doumas et al., 2008) models in broad
terms (see Figure 2). Our goal is to highlight the main processing
features of the models and their core theoretical claims. Knowlton
et al. (2012) provide another useful, brief description of the LISA
architecture. The most complete descriptions of the models may
be found in their original reports (Hummel and Holyoak, 1997,
2003; Doumas et al., 2008).
Both LISA and DORA (DORA is a direct descendent and
generalization of LISA) are symbolic connectionist models.
However, unlike traditional connectionist networks (e.g.,
McClelland, 2010), LISA and DORA solve the binding problem
(the problem of reconciling which properties correspond to
which object in a situation with two or more objects. For
example, to represent that a red square is next to a blue circle, the
system must be able to bind the square to the property of red and
the circle to blue), and so can process structured (i.e., symbolic)
representations (see Doumas and Hummel, 2005, 2012). LISA
uses structured representations of relations (represented as
predicates) and their arguments to make analogies, induce
schemas, and perform relational generalization. While LISA
assumes a vocabulary of representations provided by the modeler,
DORA provides an account of how the structured predicate
representations used by LISA can be learned from unstructured
representations of objects in the first place (i.e., flat feature vector
representations of objects without predicates; see below).
We begin by describing the representations that DORA starts
with and those that it eventually learns. We then describe how
DORA learns these knowledge structures from experience.
Finally, we describe LISA’s mapping and generalization
procedures. Both DORA’s learning and LISA’s mapping and
generalization procedures play central roles in the simulations
we report in this paper.
Knowledge Structures and Representational Form
Discovery of Relations by Analogy begins with objects
represented as flat feature vectors (Figure 3A). That is, objects
are represented as in conventional distributed connectionist
systems as patterns of activation in a set of units. These initial
representations are holistic and unstructured (see Doumas and
Hummel, 2005). In the current simulations, these feature vectors
are created by the modeler (as described in the “Simulations”
section). However, in more recent work we have extended
DORA to work from pixel images (e.g., Doumas et al., 2017a,b).
Before describing how DORA learns structured predicate
representations of object properties and relations from these
initial representations; however, we will describe the end state
of that learning. Specifically, we now describe knowledge
representation in LISA (and by extension in DORA after it has
learned).
Relational structures in the model are represented by a
hierarchy of distributed and localist1 codes (Figure 3B), in a
format defined as “LISAese” (see Hummel and Holyoak, 1997).
At the bottom, “semantic” units represent the features of objects
and roles in a distributed fashion. Semantic units don’t actually
have any necessary meaning. They are simply properties of
the perceptual stimulus that are detectable by the system (e.g.,
location on the y-axis, being cone shaped). As we discuss below,
for the purposes of LISA and DORA, exactly what these semantic
units code is not important. All that is necessary is that there are
aspects of perceptual stimuli that are consistently detectable by
the system (e.g., that when encoding two red objects, the same
semantics – or set of semantics – responds to their hue). At
the next level, these distributed representations are connected to
localist units termed POs (for Predicate-Object) that represent
individual predicates (or roles) and objects. One layer up, localist
Role-Binding units (RBs; alternatively called “subpropositions”)
link object and relational role units into specific role-filler pairs.
At the top of the hierarchy, localist P (Proposition) units link RBs
into whole relational propositions.
Considering the house object containing the square in
Problem 3, Term A (Figure 1), the proposition contains (house,
square) is represented by PO units (triangles and large circles in
Figure 3) to represent the relational roles outside and inside, and
the objects house and square. Each of these PO units is connected
to semantic units coding their semantic features. RB units
1A localist representation uses a single node to represent a single concept. By
contrast, a distributed representation uses a collection of nodes to represent a
concept.
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic illustration of how DORA and LISA work together to
enable relational learning and reasoning.
(rectangles) then conjunctively code the connection between
roles and their fillers (one RB connects house to outside, and one
connects square to inside). At the top of the hierarchy, P units
(oval) link sets of RBs into whole relational propositions. A P unit
conjunctively codes the connection between the RBs representing
outside (house) and the RB representing inside (square), thus
encoding the relational proposition contains (house, square).
Note that all of these units are simply connectionist nodes
in a layered network. While we use different names for units at
different layers, and use different shapes to specify different units
in our figures, we do so only for the purposes of more efficient
exposition. There is nothing inherently different about PO units
or RB units other than they are in different layers of a neural
network (much as different units might be in the input layer or
a hidden layer of a feed-forward neural network). However, just
as units in a hidden layer serve a different function in relation to
a network’s behavior relative to units in the input layer, so units in
the RB layer serve a different function than units in the semantic
layer.
When a proposition enters working memory, role-filler
bindings (i.e., a single role and it’s argument) must be represented
dynamically on the units that maintain role-filler independence
(i.e., POs and semantic units; see Hummel and Holyoak, 1997).
In DORA (and its instantiation of LISA), roles are dynamically
bound to their fillers by systematic asynchrony of firing. DORA’s
working memory is composed of a driver [or the current
focus of attention, akin to a “target” in analogical research (see
Gentner, 1983)] and the recipient [akin to active memory per
Cowan (2001) and akin to a “base” or “source” in analogical
frameworks (see Gentner, 1983; Holyoak and Thagard, 1989)].
As a proposition in the driver becomes active, bound objects and
roles fire in direct sequence. Binding information is carried in
the proximity of firing (e.g., with roles firing directly before their
fillers). Using the example in Figure 3, in order to bind outside
to house and inside to square [and so represent contains (house,
square)], the units corresponding to outside fire directly followed
by the units corresponding to house, followed by the units for
coding inside followed by the units for square.2
Learning Structured Representations in DORA
Discovery of Relations by Analogy is an account of how
structured representations in the form used by LISA, LISAese
representations, can be learned from unstructured examples. As
noted above, DORA begins with representations of objects coded
by simple flat feature vectors (Figure 3A). The 2d images in
these analogy-training stimuli were coded as a set of semantics
describing the perceptual characteristics of the geometric shapes
(e.g., semantic units of a square), but we do not have a strong
position on the level of semantic filtering that might impact such
perceptual processes in everyday reasoning. We instantiate these
representations as object token units attached to the semantic
units of that object (Figure 4A). These initial representations
are holistic and unstructured (in that an object’s semantics are
active together as a mass; see e.g., Doumas and Hummel, 2005,
2012). DORA’s learning algorithm allows it to learn structured
representations of specific subsets of an object’s semantics. Vitally,
these representations function like predicates in that they are
explicit and can take (i.e., be dynamically bound to) arguments.
Discovery of Relations by Analogy uses comparison to
bootstrap its learning. When DORA compares two objects, then
those objects become co-active (Figure 4A). As the compared
objects pass activation to their semantic features, those properties
shared by both objects receive twice as much input and become
roughly twice as active as unshared semantic units (Figure 4B).
DORA recruits a PO unit that learns connections to the active
semantics via simple Hebbian learning. Accordingly, the new
PO learns stronger connections to the more active (shared)
semantics, and weaker connections to the less active (unshared)
semantics (Figure 4C). DORA also recruits an RB unit at the layer
above the POs, which learns connections to the active POs via
Hebbian learning (Figure 4D).
The result of this learning algorithm is that DORA acquires
explicit representations of the shared properties of compared
objects. For example, when DORA compares two red things it
will learn an explicit representation of the property red, and if
DORA compares two objects that are containers, it will learn an
explicit representation of the property container.3 Importantly,
these new representations function like single-place predicates:
they can be bound to arguments (via asynchronous binding;
see above), they specify properties of the arguments to which
they are bound (see Doumas et al., 2008; Doumas and Hummel,
2Asynchrony-based binding allows role and filler to be coded by the same pool
of semantic units, which allows DORA to learn representations of relations from
representations of objects (Doumas et al., 2008).
3As noted above, the specific content of the units coding for a property are
unimportant to DORA. So long as there is something common across the units
representing a set of objects, DORA can learn an explicit representation of this
commonality. For the purposes of DORA’s learning algorithm, all that matters is
there is something invariant across instances of a container (which there must be
for us to learn the concept), and that the perceptual system is capable of responding
to this invariance (which, again, there must be for us to respond similarly across
instances of containment in the world).
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FIGURE 3 | Representation of (A) predicates or objects in DORA and a (B) proposition in LISA.
FIGURE 4 | DORA learns a representation of inside by comparing a square that is inside some object to a triangle inside some object. (A) DORA compares square
and triangle and units representing both become active. (B) Semantic units shared by the square and the triangle become more active than unshared semantics
(darker gray). (C) A new unit learns connections to semantics in proportion to their activation (solid lines indicate stronger connection weights). (D) The new unit
codes the featural overlap of the square and triangle (i.e., the role “inside”).
2012), and they support symbolic operations such as structure
mapping (see Hummel and Holyoak, 1997; Doumas et al., 2008)
and relational generalization (Hummel and Holyoak, 2003).
Comparison underlies DORA’s ability to learn functional
single-place predicate representations, and comparison also
allows DORA to learn representations of whole relational
structures (Figure 5). If multiple role-filler sets enter DORA’s
WM together, the model can map each set onto the other. For
example, if DORA compares the circle containing the triangle in
Figure 1 (Problem 3, Term C) to the house containing the square
(Problem 3, Term A), it could map outside (circle) to outside
(house) and inside (triangle) to inside (square). This process
leads to a distinct pattern of firing over the units composing
each set of propositions [i.e., the RB units of outside (circle)
fire out of synchrony with those of inside (triangle) while the
RB units of outside (house) fire out of synchrony with those of
inside (square)]. This pattern of oscillating activation over sets
of units (with co-occurring role-filler pairs firing in sequence)
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FIGURE 5 | DORA learns a representation of the whole relation contains (house, square) by mapping outside (circle) to outside (house) and inside (triangle) to inside
(square). (A) The units coding outside fire; (B) the units for circle and house fire; (C) the units for inside fire; (D) finally, the units for triangle and square fire. (E–F)
DORA recruits a P unit that learns connections to the active RB unit [the RB coding for outside (house)] in the recipient. (G, H) The P unit learns connections to the
active RB unit in the [the RB coding for inside (square)]. The result is a structure coding for contains (house, square).
acts as a signal to DORA to recruit a P unit, which learns
connections to active RBs via Hebbian learning. The result is that
the new P unit links co-occurring role-filler sets, and results in a
rudimentary representation of relations [here contains (object1,
object2)]. Importantly, this kind of relational representation, in
which a relation is composed of linked sets of its roles, is a
full fledged multi-place relational structure capable of the same
sorts of operations and inferences as traditional multi-place
relations (e.g., predicate calculus; Doumas and Hummel, 2005,
2012; Doumas et al., 2008).
Mapping and Relational Generalization in LISA
In LISA/DORA, representations are divided into two mutually
exclusive banks of units: a driver and one or more recipients.4 The
driver is the current focus of attention (i.e., what LISA/DORA
is thinking about at the present moment), and the recipient
is analogous to active memory in Cowan’s (2001) terms (i.e.,
items primed from long-term storage, which can be potentially
compared to items in the driver). The driver and recipient
communicate via the semantic feature units, which are shared
by both sets. Specifically, items in the driver become active and
pass activation to the semantic feature units, which activate
units in the recipient. Units in the recipient then compete
4Mutually exclusive sets are necessary in order to perform comparison (see e.g.,
Falkenhainer et al., 1989; Holyoak and Thagard, 1989). Knowlton et al. (2012)
describe how such sets can be instantiated in prefrontal cortex in a neutrally
plausible fashion.
via lateral inhibition to respond to the pattern of firing
imposed on semantic units by units in the driver. Lateral
inhibition is used here to refer to the type of inhibition
which DORA/LISA uses within relational structures to reinforce
those structures. This type of lateral inhibition has also been
referred to as driver/recipient inhibition (Morrison et al.,
2011) and also as “top-down inhibition” (Knowlton et al.,
2012). Manipulation of the parameter controlling this type
of inhibition was previously used to simulate developmental
effects in analogical reasoning (Morrison et al., 2011) and
analogy performance in patients with damage to prefrontal
cortex (Morrison et al., 2004). It is assumed that this type
of inhibition is a particularly important function of the
prefrontal cortex [see Knowlton et al. (2012) for a detailed
discussion of the role of inhibition in relational reasoning
and how DORA/LISA implements this]. This lateral inhibition
is not to be mistaken for a more general type of inhibition
found throughout the nervous system and essential for
implementing oscillatory dynamics (see Hummel and Holyoak,
2003, Appendix A).
Structured representations created during relational learning
in DORA can be mapped using LISA’s mapping algorithm
(Hummel and Holyoak, 1997) with minor modifications
described in Doumas et al. (2008). LISA/DORA learns
which elements in the driver and recipient correspond by
building mapping connections (via Hebbian learning) that
keep track of when these elements are active simultaneously.
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Importantly, LISA/DORA can make map role-filler pairs
even when the fillers have absolutely nothing in common.
For example, if LISA/DORA encounters two objects
that are completely featurally independent, but are both
bound to the higher role (i.e., both objects are higher
than some other thing), it can map them. This capacity
allows LISA/DORA to make mappings based solely on
the relational properties of objects (see e.g., Hummel and
Holyoak, 2003; Doumas et al., 2008). At the same time,
LISA/DORA can make incorrect analogies if there is no
relational correspondence.
When augmented with the capacity for self-supervised
learning (Hummel and Holyoak, 2003; Doumas et al., 2008;
described below), LISA’s mapping algorithm allows for analogical
inference. To illustrate, consider how LISA/DORA solves an
inference problem such as the third problem in Figure 15. The
A and B terms are in the driver and the C term is in the recipient.
As the proposition coding for A term, contains (house, square),
becomes active in the driver, it activates and consequently maps
to the units coding for contains (circle, triangle) in the recipient.
Specifically, the units coding for outside (house) in the driver
activate and map to the units coding for outside (circle) in the
recipient, and the units coding for inside (square) in the driver
activate and map to the units coding for inside (triangle) in the
recipient.
Then when the B term, contains (square, shield) becomes
active in the driver, there are no corresponding units for it to
map to in the recipient. As the representation of the C term in the
recipient is already mapped to the representations of the A term
in the driver (and the C term is the only item in the recipient),
the representation of the B term is left with nothing to which it
corresponds. This situation, in which items in the driver have
no elements in the recipient that they can activate (because all
recipient elements are already mapped to other driver elements),
triggers the self-supervised learning algorithm in LISA/DORA.
During self-supervised learning, active units in the driver prompt
LISA/DORA to recruit matching units in the recipient (i.e., an
active RB unit in the driver prompts recruitment of an RB
unit in the recipient). Continuing the example, as units coding
for outside (square) in the B term become active in the driver,
LISA/DORA recruits RB and P units in the recipient to match the
active RB and P units in the driver. The new recruited P unit in
the recipient learns connections to active recipient RB units, and
newly recruited RB units learn connections to active PO units via
Hebbian learning. This is a strictly layered model. The functional
result of this unit-based recruitment and Hebbian learning is
that LISA/DORA infers a representation of outside (triangle) in
the recipient, which corresponds to the representation of outside
(square) in the driver. An analogous sequence occurs when inside
(house) fires in the driver and LISA/DORA infers inside (circle)
in the recipient. Thus, LISA/DORA completes the D term in a
problem via analogical inference, inferring a representation of
contains (triangle, circle) in the recipient.
5The problem is more relationally complex than the simple version we describe
here; however, the same principles apply to the way LISA can solve the entire
problem, including all of the nested relations.
The role of inhibition in DORA/LISA
Of particular importance to the present simulations, inhibition
plays a role in the selection of items to enter working memory
because selection is a competitive process. As noted above,
inhibition is conceptualized here not at the low level of neuronal
firing, nor operationalized at the high level of overall brain
activity, but rather as part of the attentional control aspects
of the working memory system that would control what
representational information enters active working memory.
More specifically, propositions in the driver compete to enter
into working memory on the basis of several factors, including
their pragmatic centrality or importance, support from other
propositions that have recently fired, and the recency with which
they themselves have fired. Reduced driver inhibition results
in reduced competition and more random selection of RBs
to fire. The selection of which RBs are chosen to fire, and
in what order, can have substantial effects on DORA/LISA’s
ability to find a structurally consistent mapping between analogs.
It follows that reduced driver inhibition, resulting in more
random selection of propositions into working memory, can
affect DORA/LISA’s ability to discover a structurally consistent
mapping.
The role of inhibition in the activity of a recipient analog
is directly analogous to its role in the activity in the driver.
Recipient inhibition causes units in the recipient to compete to
respond to the semantic patterns generated by activity in the
driver. If DORA/LISA’s capacity to inhibit units in the recipient
is compromised, then the result is a loss of competition, with
many units in the recipient responding to any given pattern
generated by the driver. The resulting chaos hampers (in the limit,
completely destroys) DORA/LISA’s ability to discover which
units in the recipient map to which in the driver. In short,
inhibition determines DORA/LISA’s working memory capacity
(see Hummel and Holyoak, 2003, Appendix A; Hummel and
Holyoak, 2005), controls the model’s ability to select items
for placement into working memory, and also regulates its
ability to control the spreading of activation in the various
recipient analogs (see Knowlton et al., 2012). As such, inhibition
is critical for the model’s ability to favor relational similarity
over featural similarity. Relevant representations were sampled
randomly from LTM. Relevance was defined as being strongly
connected (weight above 0.9) to semantics defining a specific
relation.
This conception is highly complementary to behavioral
models suggesting IC in EF contributes to reasoning performance
by enabling reasoners to inhibit rules used previously in favor
of current goal requirements (e.g., Zelazo and Frye, 1998;
Zelazo et al., 2003). Thus, we hypothesized that differences
between the three groups of children in Hosenfeld et al. (1997b)
study were at least partially a product of differences in IC.
We simulated these differences in DORA/LISA by varying
levels of lateral inhibition. In DORA/LISA, inhibition is critical
to the selection of information for processing in working
memory. Specifically, inhibition determines the intrinsic limit
on DORA/LISA’s working-memory capacity (see Hummel and
Holyoak, 2003, Appendix A), controls its ability to select items for
placement into working memory, and also regulates its ability to
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control the spreading of activation in the recipient [see Knowlton
et al. (2012) and Morrison et al. (2004, 2011) for discussions
of these latter roles]. We have previously used this approach in
LISA to simulate patterns of analogy performance in a variety
of populations with lesser working-memory capacity including
older adults (Viskontas et al., 2004), patients with damage to
prefrontal cortex (Morrison et al., 2004), and young children
(Morrison et al., 2011).
Simulations
We simulated Hosenfeld et al. (1997b) results in two steps
(Figure 2). In the first step we used DORA’s relation-learning
algorithm to learn representations of the transformations used
in the geometric analogy problems. In our simulations, DORA
began with representations of 100 objects attached to random
sets of semantic units (chosen from a pool of 1000). We
then defined five transformations [the same as those used by
Hosenfeld et al. (1997b): adding an element, changing size,
halving, doubling, and changing containment]. Each single-place
predicate transformation (adding an element, changing size,
halving, doubling) consisted of two semantic units, and the
relational transformation (changing containment) consisted of
two roles each with two semantic units (i.e., for the contains
relation, both the roles inside and outside were each defined
by two specific semantic units). Again, as noted above, these
semantic units had no actual content. Rather, they represented
our assumption that there are invariant properties of objects
and transformations that are detectable by the perceptual system.
Our goal in this first simulation was simply to demonstrate
that DORA could isolate and learn explicit representations of
invariant properties during completely unstructured training.
Each of the 100 objects was attached to the semantics of
between two and four transformations chosen at random. If an
object was part of a relational transformation, it was attached to
the semantics of one of the roles, chosen at random. For example,
object1 might be attached to the semantics for doubled (a single-
place transformation) and inside (one role of the relational
transformation, contains).
We presented DORA with sets of objects selected at random,
and allowed it to compare the objects and learn from the
results (applying DORA’s relation-learning algorithm). As DORA
learned new representations it would use these representations
to make subsequent comparisons. For example, if DORA learned
an explicit representation of the property double by comparing
two objects both attached to the semantics of double, it could
use this new representation for future comparisons. On each
trial we selected between two and six representations and let
DORA compare them and learn from the results (i.e., perform
predication and relation-learning routines). We assume that this
act of inspection and comparison is similar to what happens
when children encounter the geometric analogy problems and
have to consider how the various elements are related (Gentner
and Smith, 2013). Importantly, this training was completely
unstructured and undirected (i.e., DORA randomly selected
items from memory to reason about). We have demonstrated in
previous work that DORA can learn under these unstructured
conditions, and that learning improves markedly with more
directed or more structured training (see Doumas et al., 2008).
We have no doubt that the children in Hosenfeld et al. (1997b)
study learned from their experience with the various versions
of the geometric analogy task, and that taking the test over
successive sessions served to structure their training somewhat.
For the current simulations, however, we wanted to make
as few assumptions about the learning environments of the
children in the study as possible (given this information is, very
understandably, absent from Hosenfeld et al., 1997b). As such,
we chose to handicap ourselves and avoid making additional
assumptions that would improve our overall ability to fit the data.
Moreover, we defined three groups for the purposes of the
simulation as determined by a range of lateral inhibition values.
We ran 100 simulations for each group. During each simulation
we chose an inhibition level from a normal distribution, with a
mean of 0.4 for the low inhibition group, 0.6 for the medium
inhibition group, and 0.8 for the high inhibition group (each
distribution had a SD = 0.1). These were selected to evaluate the
hypothesis that these three groups would show the same pattern
of analogy performance trajectories as in the behavioral data.
This would mean that the high inhibition group would align
with the Analogical group, beginning and continuing to generate
analogical solutions. The middle inhibition group would simulate
the Transition trajectory, beginning non-relational and ending
analogical, and the low inhibition group would simulate the Non-
Analogical group, who begin and end non-analogical. We chose
to simulate groups using a distribution of inhibition scores in
order to match our assumption that the learning groups from
Hosenfeld et al. (1997b) study were not completely homogeneous
in their inhibitory abilities. Our decision once again served to
handicap the precision of our simulations by adding some noise,
but there was almost certainly some natural variability in the
inhibitory abilities of the children in the initial study, and we
wanted our simulations to reflect this variability.
For the low-knowledge condition, simulations were run
with 800 learning trials, and we checked the quality of the
representations DORA had learned after each 100 learning
trials. Quality was calculated as the mean of connection
weights to relevant semantics (i.e., those defining a specific
transformation or role of a transformation) divided by the
mean of all other connection weights +1 (1 was added in
the denominator to keep the quality metric bound between 0
and 1). For the high-inhibition, high-knowledge condition we
extended the simulations to 1000 learning trials and sampled the
representations after 300–1000 trials. The reason for the different
knowledge conditions was to test our hypothesis that children in
the group that started high and stayed analogical not only had
higher inhibitory resources, but also came into the study with a
higher quality of relational representations. In brief, our goal was
to test whether starting at a higher knowledge state in tandem
with increased inhibitory resources would provide a closer fit to
the analogical throughout group’s data than increased inhibitory
resources in isolation.
Figure 6 provides a summary of results from Part 1 of the
simulation. While all groups did learn, learning was obviously
improved with higher levels of inhibition. In addition, learning
was much faster for the higher inhibition group. The simulation
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FIGURE 6 | Simulation of relational learning in DORA. DORA’s relational
learning algorithm was run at either low (0.4), medium (0.6), or high (0.8)
lateral inhibition levels for 100–800 iterations to generate representations used
in LISA for the low-knowledge condition. For the high-knowledge version a
high (0.8) lateral inhibition level was used for 300–1100 iterations.
data are presented using the eight testing trials in the behavioral
data to frame intervals and to allow for comparing the
simulations to the empirical data, which will be added in Figure 7.
In the second part of the simulation we passed the
representations DORA learned during the first part of the
simulation to LISA, which then simulated solving the geometric
analogy problems. Thus, unlike LISA simulations we have
performed previously to account for developmental changes (e.g.,
Morrison et al., 2011), relational knowledge representations were
not hand-coded, but rather were generated automatically by
DORA. We created problems of varying difficulty to capture
the range of difficulty used in the Hosenfeld et al. (1997b).
Thirty percent of problems were hard problems consisting of
three transformations (one-third had two binary transformations
and one unary transformation; one-third had one binary
transformation and two unary transformations; and one-third
had three unary transformations). Thirty-five percent were
medium difficulty problems consisting of two transformations
(one-third had two binary transformations; one-third had two
unary transformations; and one-third had one binary and
one unary transformation). Lastly, 35% were easier problems
with only one transformation per problem (half had one
binary transformation while the other half had one unary
transformation).
We simulated all eight of the testing phases in the Hosenfeld
et al. (1997b) study. Each testing phase consisted of 20 trials.
On each trial we presented LISA/DORA with the A and B
terms in the driver and the C term in the recipient. The A,
B, and C terms were represented as object POs each attached
to four random semantics, and bound to PO predicate units
identifying the transformations in which they were involved.
Importantly, the PO units identifying the transformations (as
well as the RB units linking predicate and object POs, and P
units linking RBs) were representations that DORA had learned
during the first part of the simulation. For example, if the A
term was a shield inside a square, we represented that with
the LISEese proposition contains (square, shield), with a PO
representing square bound to a PO representing outside (where
outside was a PO that DORA had learned during the first part
of the simulation), and a PO representing shield bound to a
PO representing inside (where inside was a PO that DORA
had learned during the first part of the simulation). For the
first testing phase for the low-knowledge groups we used the
representations DORA had learned after the first 100 learning
trials as described above, for the second testing phase we used
the representations DORA had learned after the first 200 learning
trials, and so on. For the high-knowledge groups, we used the
representations DORA had learned after the first 300 learning
trials for the first testing phase, the representations learned after
the first 400 learning trials for the second testing phase, and so
forth. In each knowledge condition we treated the level of lateral
inhibition as maturational, and thus used the same levels as used
for the learning phase for each group [0.4 low, 0.6 medium (or
transitional), 0.80 high; each with ± 0.1 SD distribution]. We
used the same level because the interval from the beginning
and end of the training study was a short period of time in the
developmental trajectory of children’s EFs, so we would expect
EFs not to change within an individual in that period of time.
As noted directly above, using slightly more advanced
representations (the high-knowledge group) reflects the
assumption that children with higher maturational IC are likely
to have learned more about relations prior to beginning the
study compared to children with lower maturational IC. Note
that by starting testing with representations at 100 we assume
that all children have some capacity for representing relations.
This assumption is reflected in Hosenfeld et al.’s (1997b) data, in
that low- and transitional-analogy group children started with
similarly low scores in the first testing phase, whereas children in
the high-analogy group started with much higher performance
on the first testing phase. Thus, we examine whether relational
knowledge and IC contributed differently to the behavioral data,
which they do seem to do, though the combination of knowledge
and IC best explains the growth trajectories. This supports the
claim that these are likely to co-vary but they each provide
additional contributions.
During test trials, LISA attempted to map driver and recipient
propositions and make inferences about the missing D term. For
example, if LISA mapped the A term in the driver to the C term,
then when the B term fired LISA inferred the D term in the
recipient. We took the inferred proposition in the recipient to be
LISA’s answer on that trial.
As is apparent from the learning trajectories plotted in
Figure 7, DORA/LISA’s performance on the testing trials closely
followed those of the children in Hosenfeld et al.’s (1997b)
study. Just like the non-analogical children, DORA/LISA with a
low lateral inhibition level performed poorly throughout. Like
the transitional children, DORA/LISA with a medium lateral
inhibition level started slow, but slowly improved. Finally, like
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FIGURE 7 | Results from children (Hosenfeld et al., 1997b) and LISA
simulations. Simulation results were obtained by allowing LISA to make
analogical inferences using the representations generated in DORA (Figure 6).
The three performance groups of children were simulated by using three
different levels of lateral inhibition in both DORA and LISA. Solid lines depict
the data from “Hosenfeld et al. (1997b)” while the dashed lines are the
simulated data.
the analogical children DORA/LISA with high lateral inhibition
levels performed well virtually from the start and maintained
good performance; however, additional relational knowledge
coupled with high lateral inhibition levels appears to best fit the
analogical performance group.
Importantly, the types of errors that DORA/LISA makes
closely follow the types of errors made by each of the performance
groups (Table 1). Specifically, like the non-analogical children,
low-inhibition DORA tended to make errors based on featural
association errors (e.g., objects in A, B, and C copied). Like
transitional children, with medium inhibition, DORA tended
to make featural/associative errors at the beginning, but these
largely disappeared by the final session. Finally, like the analogical
children, with high inhibition, DORA tended to make fewer
errors overall, which further decreased over time, but these
errors that did happen were a mix of associative and incomplete
solutions.
Moreover, the kinds of problems that DORA “got wrong”
at various inhibition levels seem highly in line with the kinds
of problems that children seem to make errors on as they
develop. While Hosenfeld et al. (1997b) do not give specific
data on which problems the children tended to get wrong, a
good deal of previous research has been done on children’s
analogical development using cross sectional designs (see above;
e.g., Richland et al., 2006). Generally, children tend to develop
a capacity for solving simpler analogy problems first, and solve
such problems consistently before they develop the capacity for
solving harder analogy problems. For example, Richland et al.
(2006) found that young children around the age of 3 years
perform consistently above chance on simple analogy problems
that require aligning pairs of elements across two pictures (e.g., a
task that requires matching the cat in a picture of a dog chasing a
cat, to the boy, in a picture of a mother chasing a boy). However,
these same children perform very poorly when the task is made
harder, either by adding distractor elements to one or both of
the pictures, or by requiring integration across multiple relations
(see above). Around age 7 years, children consistently solve
problems either requiring relational integration or involving
distractors, but perform less well on problems involving a
distractor and requiring relational integration. Finally, by age
14 years, participants could consistently solve all the types of
analogy problems tested. Similarly, DORA, across all inhibition
levels, performed well on some classes of problems and less
well on other classes. Specifically, low-inhibition DORA did
consistently quite well on the easiest problem types, but quite
poorly on the medium and hard problems. Medium inhibition
DORA performed well on easy problems, made some headway
on the medium problems, and did very poorly on the hard
problems. High inhibition DORA was competent across all
problem difficulties, but failed most consistently on the hard
problems.
DISCUSSION
These simulations provide a mechanism by which resources for
IC can account for children’s analogical reasoning development
(Richland and Burchinal, 2013). We have previously argued
that IC is an essential factor in understanding the development
of analogical reasoning in children because changes in IC
can explain both featural distraction and relational complexity
effects during childhood (Morrison et al., 2011). However, a
complete understanding of the development of analogy must
also include the role of relation learning and the factors
that impact the growth of relational knowledge over time.
With these simulations we demonstrate that with learning
opportunities the model, like children, moved from preferentially
attending to featural information, to reasoning with relational
representations. These simulations suggest that a child’s level
of IC in working memory may play an essential role in
determining their learning trajectory by modulating the noise
through which children identify and train their relational
representations. Thus, changes in IC during learning and
reasoning help to explain the relational shift (Gentner and
Rattermann, 1991) observed in young children’s relational
reasoning.
Why does such a simple change in a single parameter
have such a complex effect and thus explain so much? We
theorize that this results from IC in working memory being
important not only for relational reasoning but also for the
process of learning relational representations, which occurs
as children attempt to use relational reasoning. In the past,
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TABLE 1 | Solution Patterns in Children’s and DORA/LISA Simulations for the Three Learning Trajectories
Non-analogical Transitional Analogical
Children DORA/LISA
(low
knowledge)
Children DORA/LISA
(low
knowledge)
Children DORA/LISA
(low
knowledge)
DORA/LISA
(high
knowledge)
Analogical solution 21 25 56 57 78 77 85
Incomplete solution 21 17 28 26 18 17 13
Associative solution 58 58 16 17 3 6 2
Children’s results based on data presented in Table 5 (p. 384) of Hosenfeld et al. (1997b).
research in this area has focused more on the roles of
IC during reasoning, and pre-existing knowledge. We have
previously shown that greater IC in an individual can help
a child avoid distraction from irrelevant information within
relational representations (see Morrison et al., 2011). And,
while it is frequently argued that analogical reasoning ability
is tied to pre-existing knowledge of a domain and thus better
structured representations (e.g., Gentner and Rattermann, 1991),
these simulations show that regardless of the quality of prior
knowledge representations, the ability to inhibit mappings due
to non-relationally central aspects of representations may also
rely on adequate IC. This means that an adult can form a
valid analogy between two domains about which they know
relatively little, allowing them to presumably improve their
knowledge representations, whereas a 3-year-old child might
know quite a bit about two domains yet still fail to inhibit
a featural distractor when attempting to make an analogical
mapping.
The second way that the IC parameter impacts performance
is specifically tied to relational learning. In our model,
IC is necessary for not only relational reasoning but also
relational learning, an assumption supported by longitudinal
studies showing that early EFs can predict children’s growth
rates in analogy performance (Richland and Burchinal,
2013). Thus, the model posits that children with lower
IC will learn relations less efficiently, satisficing based
on featural similarities rather than noticing relational
commonalities across representations, and thereby moving
toward reasoning analogically. This means they may take
more time to identify and abstract common relations across
representations, and sometimes (as in the specific case of the
non-analogical learners here), may not learn key relations
despite multiple opportunities to abstract them from dirty
representations.
The combination of these two factors results in our complex
pattern of simulations. The simulations suggest that the
children low in IC had difficulty building relationally precise
representations, and also were less able to reason with these
“dirty,” incomplete representations during reasoning, likely
leading to more distraction. In contrast, children with high
IC built relationally precise representations quickly and were
also more tolerant of “dirty” representations, reasoning based
on the relevant relational correspondences and minimizing
errors based on irrelevant distractors. Our middle IC group
operates at the perfect “teachable moment,” something akin
to Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development (Vygotsky,
1978) – they possess just the right amount of IC to efficiently
build relational representations which become sufficient
during the training sessions to yield successful analogical
reasoning.
One very important limitation of our current simulations
stems from the kinds of problems used in the original Hosenfeld
et al. (1997b) study, and in our simulations. Specifically, as has
been argued previously (e.g., Thibaut and French, 2016), in the
A:B::C:D tasks, the subject’s goal is to find the item (D) that
matches (B) in the same way that (C) matches (A). The fact
that (C) corresponds to (A) is given by the structure of the
problem. In many tasks people draw analogies between situations
without knowing these sorts of correspondences beforehand (e.g.,
Markman and Gentner, 1993; Richland et al., 2006). However,
as argued above, we believe the longitudinal nature of the data
collected by Hosenfeld and colleagues has a number of merits
and that any full account of the development of relational
reasoning needs to account for the findings that this study reveals.
Particularly, (a) Hosenfeld et al. (1997a,b) is, to our knowledge,
the only longitudinal study of analogical development with
multiple repeated data collection points; (b) the difficulty of
many of the problems used in the study makes solving them
difficult even for adults; and (c) the (D) term was not given to
the children to select (as is often the case with A:B::C:D analogy
problems), but rather had to be generated in full. Finally, it
is important to note that in our simulations we did not give
DORA the (A)–(C) correspondence a priori. DORA had to
discover the (A)–(C) correspondence via it’s mapping algorithm,
and failure to do so made the generation of the (D) term all
but impossible. As such, while our simulations are limited by
the exclusive use of A:B::C:D type analogy problems in the
original study, we do find the original study a very important
piece in our current understanding of analogical development,
and, therefore, hold that simulating the study is an important
milestone for any account of the development of analogical
thinking.
To conclude, while considerable effort has been directed
at understanding how IC supports analogical reasoning, less
attention has been given to the role of IC in its essential
antecedent – relational learning. Appreciating the importance
of IC during both relational learning and reasoning constitutes
an important step toward understanding how relational learning
develops and how it can contribute to successful analogical
reasoning in children.
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